

Do We Dwell Within the Call of Being by Virtue of Our Languages?

An Oriental Understanding From the Occidental Daseinsanalytic Concepts

Wohnen wir im Ruf des Seins durch unsere Sprachen?

Ein orientalisches Verständnis abendländischer daseinsanalytischer Begriffe

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Kurzzusammenfassung

Alle Wörter, in welcher Sprache auch immer, sind nichts anderes als Pfeile, die auf Begriffe zeigen, um sie zu bezeichnen. Begriffe, ob sie in einer bestimmten Sprache erkannt und bezeichnet werden oder nicht, können als Bezeichnungsmöglichkeiten betrachtet werden, auf die das Dasein sein Sein projizieren kann. Als Signifikanten, die aus verschiedenen Sprachen stammen, können sich diese Wörter manchmal auf genau denselben Begriff beziehen, vor allem wenn er konkret ist. Einige der sogenannten Äquivalente, zum Beispiel „das Sein“ im Deutschen und „being“ im Englischen, sind jedoch nicht in der Lage, genau denselben Begriff zu bezeichnen. Das von Wittgenstein inspirierte Farbspektrum der Begriffe wird in diesem Artikel als Modell vorgeschlagen, um die Missverständnisse im Bereich der Daseinsanalyse zwischen dem Deutsch und dem Englisch aufzudecken und weitere Missverständnisse vorzubeugen. Die Analogie zu den spezifischen Zonen eines Farbspektrums, auf die solche Äquivalente als verschiedene Signifikanten hinweisen, verdeutlicht, dass die Erschaffung von Neologismen als eine praktikable Methode angesehen werden kann, um in der Zielsprache denselben Begriff zu bezeichnen, auf den in der Ausgangssprache hingewiesen wird. Letztendlich wird gezeigt, dass wir in dem Anspruch und dem Ruf des Seins durch unsere Sprachen verweilen. Durch sie

begegnen wir allem, erschließen uns selbst und können von uns selbst aus der Ferne in die Ferne gerufen werden.

Schlüsselwörter

Sprache, Daseinsanalyse, Zeit vs. time, Sein vs. being, Farbspektrum der Begriffe

Abstract

All the words, regardless of the languages they belong to, are nothing but arrows pointing to concepts to signify them. Concepts, whether recognized and signified in a particular language or not, could be considered signifiable possibilities onto which Dasein could project its Being. As signifiers from different languages, these words sometimes refer to the exact same concept, especially when it is concrete; however, some of the so-called equivalents, for instance “das Sein” in German and “being” in English, are not able to signify accurately the same concept. The Color Spectrum of Concepts, inspired by Wittgenstein, is suggested in this article as a model to reveal the recent misconceptualizations in the realm of Daseinsanalysis between German and English and to prevent further misunderstandings. Using the analogy of the specific zones of a color spectrum, which represent similar concepts signified by equivalents from diverse languages, elucidates that neologism and the restructuring of new, accurate daseinsanalytic equivalents could be considered a feasible method to signify the same concept in the target language that is pointed to in the source language. Ultimately, it is illustrated that we dwell within the claim and call of Being by virtue of our languages through which we encounter everything, we reveal ourselves or we may be called by ourselves from afar unto afar.

keywords

language, daseinsanalysis, Zeit vs. time, Sein vs. being, color spectrum of concepts

1. Introduction

The dualism between the word and the concept to which it refers, as is declared by Wittgenstein, could lead to different understandings of “das Sein”, “Dasein”, and consequently of Daseinsanalysis in different languages. English is considered the current dominant language in scientific research and the disambiguating of the daseinsanalytic concepts which originally come from German in English could elucidate the common misconceptions in other languages as well.

Some of studies have utilized the terms “Daseinsanalysis” and “existential analysis” interchangeably, but Rollo May, who inserted “existential analysis” as an equivalent for “Daseinsanalysis”, clarified that “Dasein” is not translatable (May, Angel, & Ellenberger, 1958, p. 118). Mistaking one concept for another when dealing with daseinsanalytic concepts could lead to further misconceptions in this field. Daseinsanalysis is rooted in philosophy, and “the basic problem of philosophy according to Wittgenstein’s view is confusion about concepts” (Richter, 2004, p. 48). To avoid the misconceptions that arise from this confusion, it is necessary to illustrate daseinsanalytic concepts, including those which are signified as equivalent in different languages. Regardless of what language one speaks, there will always be a dualism between the words spoken and the concepts meant. According to §15 “signifying” is considered the process of marking a concept by using a word as a sign (Wittgenstein, 1953), and in this paper the signified daseinsanalytic concepts in English and German would be compared to reveal the misunderstandings.

During the presentations and seminars conducted in English at SFU among a diverse group of students with different native languages, the author noticed some subtle differences in the meant concepts of a single English word. These kinds of misunderstandings, which resulted from thinking in one language and presenting the meant concept in another language, seemed to be based on the nature of “signifying”. Therefore, in this paper the author proposes to clarify them by the means of a specific model.

In the field of Daseinsanalysis, the problem of signifying a concept in different languages manifests itself, when one single word like “being” in English is the only existing word to signify different concepts. In German these concepts are explicitly signified by separate words like “sein”, “das Sein”, “seiend”, and “das Seiende”. Trying to translate a word like “das Seiende”, which signifies a subtle and profound concept, into another language, such as English, makes it clear how limited we are by linguistic boundaries; however, the greater the variety of words that point to distinct but close concepts, the better are we able to convey precise meanings. Therefore, there would be less misunderstanding about the issue in that language.

The prominent status of language in conveying meaning and understanding made the author advance her knowledge of the concept of “das Sein” by comparing it with the concept of “being”. Both concepts have their own unique attributes and offer nuances that are limited by current linguistic barriers and grammatical frameworks. Wittgenstein (1953) explains the interaction between two people by a language game, during which there is a kind of translation in progress. Thus, the Color Spectrum of Concepts (CSC), especially inspired by philosophical investigations §48 and §53 is offered here as a

model to depict how these language barriers could lead to misunderstanding in the realm of Daseinsanalysis.

The CSC model emphasizes being accurate with daseinsanalytic concepts from the source language. However, these concepts have equivalents, known as signifiers, that come from different languages. By providing a kind of topological mapping, this model facilitates the process of understanding daseinsanalytic concepts in the source language and comparing them with their equivalents.

The word which refers to a concept, is considered an arrow and according to philosophical investigations §454 (Wittgenstein, 1953), such an arrow carries nothing but itself. Concepts have signifiable possibilities, so that “Dasein” could project its Being onto them of its own accord. Although these concepts could be signified by means of words, but reaching out to them depends on the viability and the limitations of each language's vocabulary and grammar. The CSC could be used as a model to clarify daseinsanalytic concepts in different languages and to avoid common misconception to reach a precise understanding despite the language barriers.

2. Language in Psychotherapy and Daseinsanalysis

Whenever psychotherapy works, it has something to do with the nature of language and with the nature of poeties¹ (Poltrum, 2016, p. 37). Considering psychotherapy as “talking therapy” leads to the fact that language by itself, as the only tool for talking, is of great importance in psychotherapy (Frank, 1961; Kiesler, 1966; Smith, 1978; Brill, 1972; Forrester, 1980; MacCabe, 1981; Patton, 1984; Pepinsky, 1985; Rogers & Schmidt, 2016; Wilson, 2018). Language is of such a crucial relevance to philosophy - and consequently to Daseinsanalysis – that Heidegger called language “the house of being [Being]”² (1971, p. 5). He alleged that the language, in which we born, grow up and live in, is our homeland³ (1983, p. 156). Binswanger, who introduced the term Daseinsanalysis⁴ into the field of psychotherapy, believes that Being and, correspondingly, Being-in-the-world is of utmost importance⁵ (1960, p. 254). The relationship between language and Being is declared concisely by Heidegger: “The language is the original poetry, in which someone writes the Being”⁶ (1983, p. 180).

The concept of Being-in-the-world could be summed up in the term “Dasein”, which might be inaccurately translated into the term “being there”. This term is not a proper equivalent because it

¹ Poltrum uses the term “Dichterisch” as a substantive from the adjective which signifies “poetic”. Although this word is singular in German, but it is translated here poeties because the meant concept in the source language pertains to the “poetic things in general” and the author did not find an accurate equivalent for it in English.

² Due to the ambiguity of the word “being” in English, Macquarrie and Robinson proposed “Being” with capital B as the equivalent for “das Sein” in German.

³ Sprache ist indes noch immer die jeweilige Sprache, in die Völkerschaften und Stämme hineingeboren werden, worin sie aufwachsen und wohnen. In gleicher Weise: Die Heimat gibt es nicht auf dieser Erde. Heimat ist jeweils diese und als solches Schicksal. Sprache ist, aus ihrem Walten und Wesen heraus, jeweils Sprache einer Heimat, Sprache, die einheimisch erwacht und man im Hause der Eltern spricht. Sprache ist Sprache als Muttersprache.

⁴ Ambiguous; is translated “existential psychotherapy” in some papers

⁵ Grund und Boden aber findet jede Wissenschaft, und so auch die Psychopathologie und die Psychotherapie, nur in ihrem apriorisch freigelegten eigentlichen Verstehenshorizont, hier in dem apriorischen Entwurf des alles beherrschenden Seinsgefüges überhaupt und des Daseins als In-der-Welt-Sein im Speziellen.

⁶ Die Sprache ist die Urdichtung, in der ein Volk das Sein dichtet.

pertains to everything and not specifically to humans. According to Heidegger's phenomenological approach, "Dasein" implies openness to the world and to the entities it encounters, including itself. Through this openness, Dasein perceives its own Being, in which it is brought before itself and becomes disclosed to itself once it is thrown in the world. Dasein is a "thrown projection" ("geworfener Entwurf") and projects itself as long as it is, and this projecting as a kind of Being always has always understood itself and will always understand itself in terms of possibilities. This understanding does not grasp thematically the possibilities upon which it projects; since grasping would take away the very character of a possibility and would reduce it to the given contents, which we have in mind (1962, pp. 185, 225).

The author noticed that "possibilities", reduced into the given contents in the mind or not, could differ in the realm of different languages due to the different way of conceptualizing. Understanding our Being-in-the-world or "Dasein" through different languages provokes each language to offer its own specified possibilities and these very possibilities upon which we may project ourselves, might not exist in another language at the present time. Trying to understand Heidegger's concepts through three languages led the author to the probability of various types of possibilities of existing as a whole potentiality-for-Being that might dwell in different linguistic boundaries. Reading, thinking, and trying to understand in English, German, and her own mother tongue looked like chasing daseinsanalytic issues in three different parallel worlds. Through this fantastic journey the author sometimes encountered with totally different conceptualizations from a sole daseinsanalytic issue.

Bridging the gap between the dasensanalytic concepts in German and in English, which is considered the universal form of communication in science, could lead to a worldwide clear understanding of these fundamental concepts. Simultaneously, it would enrich the Daseinsanalysis in other languages and prevents the promotion of common global misconceptions rooted in other languages' reliance on English. A deep understanding of the daseinsanalytic concepts, which are signified by words like "Dasein" in German, depends on clarifying the current vagueness.

The diversity of concepts that could be signified by a single word like "being" in English, makes it difficult to understand where it precisely points to the meant concept which is signified by "das Sein". Yet, the concepts of "being" have been explicitly signified by separate words in German: "sein", "das Sein", "seiend", and "der Seiende". Conceptualizing all these different German words with the single word "being" in English makes the discussed issue more complicated. The absence of a clear boundary between the daseinsanalytic German concepts and their equivalents in English leads to some misconceptions in this field that could be depicted by considering these signified concepts on a single color spectrum.

3. Dasein

Among the concepts discussed by Heidegger, Dasein is of great importance. May explains that the subtle fact of Dasein's being untranslatable lies behind Heidegger's philosophy that is based on the contrast between the "existence" of an inanimate thing as *Vorhandensein* and "existence" of a human being as *Dasein* (May, Angel, & Ellenberger, 1958, p. 118). "Existence precedes essence" does not seem a suitable slogan for Dasein whose essence lies in its existence (Heidegger, 1962, p. 67), and

consequently Existential Analysis does not seem to be an accurate translation for Daseinsanalysis as well.

The German word Dasein is capable of capturing the relation of Being to the essence of man in one word. The essence of Dasein which lies in its existence, is presented in this German word as being “there” and “just now”. Yet, it implies the openness of this Being as a prerequisite for becoming the very Dasein, which is on the way. The word “da” in German is often used to signify a particular “place”, “time” or “causality”, while “sein” could be translated into “being”; but according to Heidegger this very “being” as “there” confronts the world “just now”; consequently, the concept of “Dasein” in German is inseparable from spatiality and temporality, while without these two concepts, the concept of “Being” would never be properly understood (Heidegger, 1962). According to Boss (1982, p. 45), spatiality would be understood just on the basis of temporality. Moreover, the concept of temporality is closely linked to the concept of “die Zeit”, which is introduced by Heidegger as something completely different from the common definition of “time” in English.

4. *Die Zeit vs. time*

The word “time” in English is utilized as an equivalent for “die Zeit” in German, although it does not point precisely to the same concept which is signified by the word “die Zeit”. The common concept of the word “time” could be generally asked by “what time is it?” and would be identified by looking at the clock. In this case, the meant concept depends on the observer’s particular location on Earth and its temporal position relative to the sun. For every geographical place of observation on Earth, there is a well-defined corresponding time. Accordingly, “time” as a quantitative concept could be considered a function of place but the concept of “die Zeit” seems somehow different.

The concept of “die Zeit” does not refer to the constant clockwise dance of man-made clock hands on the clock face. It could be understood completely independently of the observer’s position on the Earth or the Earth’s position relative to the sun. “Die Zeit” differs from “die Uhrzeit”; it is a qualitative concept which, in Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*, pertains to the unique active constant Being (das Seiende) as a quality of “Being” (das Sein). In this context “die Zeit” could be understood as an individual private concept which differs from “Seiendes” to “Seiendes”. The word “Seiendes” as the nominalized present participle of “sein” (to be) is able to refer to a quality of existence which is actively being just there and just now.⁷ Heidegger (2001) argues that in psychological experimental research, when one measures only the duration of a process, the respective “now” refers solely to a specific place of the moving object and is understood as the pure sequence of “nows” (p. 50). In the same way that our “there” in the space must be understood as an “I” on the basis of the mode of being (Boss, 1982, p. 43), our “now” must be understood as an “I” too. Dasein, as the current “I” who is always on the way to come,

⁷ The author could not offer an accurate equivalent for “Seiendes” in English and she prefers not to use the inaccurate equivalents which are proposed by different translators. Neither the word “being” seems the accurate equivalent - since it is closer to the concept of “sein” - nor the word “entity”. “Seiendes” refers to whom is existing just now actively and the word “entity” does not signify the concept of being active. Seiendes as an entity which is existing, or is being, could be considered as someone who is doing any other activities like reading a book or writing a letter and the word “entity” is not able to signify this concept.

could be considered as the individual basic unit of “die Zeit” for each person at this very moment; comparable to the second which is considered the base unit of “time” in the International System of Units (SI).

The qualitative change, which leads to the sequence of Daseins, is itself the result of new encounters based on the Dasein’s openness. Accordingly, “die Zeit” could be defined individually based on the sequence of indefinite Daseins which have been ever experienced under the integrated “I”. The difference between the concepts signified by “time” and “die Zeit” in Daseinsanalysis made the author comprehend that in trauma the very thing which is assumed as “standing still” is rather this sequence and not “time”.

Furthermore, Heidegger (1962) believes that “die Zeit” is the possible horizon for any understanding Being. The translators, Macquarrie and Robinson footnoted that “horizon” has two quiet different meaning in German and English:

Throughout this work the word “horizon” is used with a connotation somewhat different from that to which the English-speaking reader is likely to be accustomed. We tend to think of a horizon as something which we may widen or extend or go beyond; Heidegger, however, seems to think of it rather as something which we can neither widen nor go beyond, but which provides the limits for certain intellectual activities performed “within” it. (p. 19)

Some of the ambiguities in the field of Daseinsanalysis are due to such a subtle difference in understanding a concept like “die Zeit” or “horizon” in German and English. Beside the vagueness of the meant concept signified by the word “being”, a “Being” which is limited in the horizon of “die Zeit” could be understood quite differently from a “Being” might expand or go beyond “time”. Dealing with these conceptual differences among German and English equivalents could prevent the further incompatibilities in Daseinsanalysis.

5. *Das Sein vs. being*

The German word “das Sein” is argued precisely in *Sein und Zeit* written by Heidegger, while translating it and its derived forms in English is an inevitable problem. Comparing two different English translations of a single sentence from *Sein und Zeit* shows the depth of confusion which could occur in conceptualizing such a main daseinsanalytic concept in another language. A sentence⁸ from Martin Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* is cited from Stambaugh’s and from Macquarrie & Robinson’s translations, respectively:

The being which this being is concerned about in its being is always my own (1996, p. 40)

That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine (1962, p. 67)

⁸ Das Sein, darum es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein geht, ist je meines. (Heidegger, S&T, p. 42)

The confusion about the signified concept by the word “being”, is clearly explained by Macquarrie & Robinson:

Heidegger translates Plato's present participle ὄν by this present participle of the verb “sein” (to be). We accordingly translate “seiend” here and in a number of later passages by the present participle “being”; where such a translation is inconvenient we shall resort to other constructions, usually subjoining the German word in brackets or in a footnote. The participle “seiend” must be distinguished from the infinitive “sein”, which we shall usually translate either by the infinitive “to be” or by the gerund “being”. It must also be distinguished from the important substantive “Sein” (always capitalized), which we shall translate as “Being” (capitalized), and from the equally important substantive “Seiendes”, which is directly derived from “seiend”, and which we shall usually translate as “entity” or “entities”. (p. 19)

When other languages try to signify a sole concept like the concept which in German is referred to by the word “Seiendes”, they are supposed to offer some words as the perceptible signs which are capable of referring to the same concept. The German term “das Seiende”, a noun form of the verb “sein” (to be), has distinct meanings when compared with concepts like “entity”, the concept of Being (as defined by Macquarrie & Robinson) and the concept of “being”. The word “diesem Seienden” in the above sentence, as the nominal form of the verb “sein”, is an entity which is being actively in its Being. Due to the grammatical limitation, none of the translators could create a substantive like “das Seiende” out of the verb “to be”; however, the word “entity” as an equivalent does not seem to signify precisely the same concept.

6. Color Spectrum of Concepts (CSC)

Color has been a subject of philosophical discussions for years. Silva (2017) argues that color has been much considered from Aristotle's ideas about exclusions by contrariety and the principle of excluded middle to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, from Locke's discussion about of secondary qualities to so-called Hard Problem of consciousness, qualia, and debate about drawing a distinction between shape and content in Aesthetics. Not only the controversial quality of the colors but also the way we perceive them seems to be a pragmatic reason to use them as a model for clarifying the relation between the words and the concepts in Daseinsanalysis.

The similarity between the perception of a color and the perception of a concept was one of the main reasons to choose the color spectrum as a model for describing the process of understanding daseinsanalytic concepts as “Weltentwürfe”⁹. Concepts could be seen as the outcome of the individual encounter with the world. Just like concepts, colors do not exist as we know them in the world and are created inside our heads. Stevens (2013, Feb. 17) states that the brain converts a certain range of the electromagnetic spectrum into color. We are able to measure the wavelength of radiation, but we are not able to observe or measure the experience of a color inside someone's mind. The perception of

⁹ „Es sind die Weltentwürfe, die den geisteskranken Menschen vom Gesunden unterscheiden“(Binswanger, 1947, S. 217)

colors occurs in each brain individually, and it has until now not been possible to observe or measure these different perceptions. We all agree to call something for example red, we communicate “effectively” and we walk away, without even knowing that how different each of our internal experiences really were (Stevens, 2013, Feb. 17). It is the similar with concepts; we agree on names for these concepts, yet, experience our perceptions in isolation, leaving us alone in our minds.

Translation seems to be the best tool to exchange these concepts and to explore new ones in the target language. During the translation we need to compare the concepts that the words refer to, and notice the similarities and differences. In the mentioned sentences translated by Macquarrie & Robinson, “entity”, “being”, “Being”, and “das Seiende” in spite of subtle differences, signify similar concepts. This similarity makes their topological place on the proposed color spectrum close to each other, for instance somewhere between azure and violet. Since some concepts could slightly differ even for two people who speak in the same language, the signified zone for each one is assumed blurred and hazy in outline.



Figure 1: *Das Seiende, entity, Being and being*

Every ellipse on the image represents the approximate limits of a generic concept as described by its meaning in the context. Since “das Seiende” in German has not an accurate equivalent in English, its place is indicated by dotting somewhere between those three close concepts. Based on the definitions, if the concept of “being” is considered from the range of violet to indigo and the concept of “entity” from the range of indigo to green, then the concept of “Being” (das Sein) contains a part of both. In this case, the concept of “das Seiende” would be somewhere on this color spectrum, containing a bit of each of them, but still standing on its own. The inevitable misunderstanding about some daseinsanalytic concepts, based on language barriers, is clearly illustrated in this model. However, considering their place topologically on the CSC and defining them distinctively in German could help us to overcome these language barriers. For such a special zone on the CSC, which is dotted in the picture, restructuring existing English equivalents or introducing new ones through calquing is proposed.

Reading, thinking and writing in the realm of Daseinsanalysis leads each language to keep its speakers in contact with different concepts which could be mistaken for the same; It seems like living in different parallel worlds without knowing about it. Some concepts, for instance “das Seiende” or “das Dasein”,

which have been signified in a language like German, have no accurate equivalents in other languages, e.g., in English and using the inaccurate equivalents could lead to further misconceptions and misunderstandings in that language.




Figure 2 : *das Seiende, das Sein (Being), da, die Zeit, der Raum*

“Dasein”’s place on the CSC is shown on a Möbius, where the blue dotted zone ends and the red dotted zone begins. This Möbius can show us where the concept of “da” ends and the concept of “sein” begins. The word “da” in German is a joint point which is able to temporalize space while it spatializes time. The extent of the common ground between “da” and the proposed equivalent “there” is not large enough that they could be considered equivalents, since the word “there” could refer to a place but not to a time. The topological position of the signified concept on the CSC indicates that the concept of “Dasein” in English would entail a neologism according to the grammatical rules of the target language. Using the word “Dasein” in other languages does not seem sufficiently feasible, since the author could not reach its meaning neither in English nor in her own native language until she understood it in German.

Exchanging daseinsanalytic explications within different languages would be facilitated by considering concepts as topoi on a color spectrum. Comparing the two topological semantic mappings of the meant concept from the source language with its supposedly equivalent in the target language, reveals the subtle differences between them and could clear up common misunderstandings.

According to this topological semantic mapping, various concepts are signified by words that come from different languages, while there may be no known accurate equivalents in the target language. Thus, in 3.323 Wittgenstein (2002) mentions the different modes of signification for a single word in everyday language, which may differ for different people, even if they speak the same language. Wittgenstein (1953) in *Philosophical Investigations* §109 mentions:

There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its power of illumination, i.e., its purpose from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by

arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language (p. 47).

Equivalents more or less succeed in pointing to the same concepts. Translation could be considered a feasible tool for detecting the extent of the common zone between the two concepts signified in the source and in target languages. CSC facilitates defining those relatively difficult *daseinsanalytic* concepts in the target language; yet, it cannot distinguish between individual observations and perceptions.

Our perceptions are related to the world, while they are completely separate from the world itself. All the concepts that we think about are the outcomes of our Being-in-the-world. Yet, beyond language barriers, they are limited to our own individual observations and perceptions. According to the CSC, concepts are considered relatively and potentially accessible to all the languages, but the extent of this accessibility depends on each language's current vocabulary and grammar rules.

The concept of "Being" seems like a mirror broken down into more than 7000 pieces¹⁰, each language takes a piece, looks into it and calls out its own recognition as "Being". Putting these pieces back together could lead us to create an integrated understanding up from "Being" and overcome the bewitching of our intelligence by languages. Heidegger (1968) mentioned that to name is fundamentally to call, and what is called, appears as what is present (p. 120). It sounds as if we dwell within the call of Being by virtue of our languages. Through these we encounter anything, we reveal ourselves, or we may be called by ourselves.

¹⁰ There are more than 7000 languages in the world and this allegory is inspired by an old Persian Narration about Truth: Truth was a mirror in God's hand, it fell down from the skies and was broken, everybody took a piece of it looked him/herself into that and thought the truth is owned by him/her, but the truth was separated among all.

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